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There are three fundamental dynamics of civil conflicts: Onset, du-
ration, and cessation. Theoretical and empirical models of war usually
focus on one or at most two aspects of these three important dynamics.
We argue that a better understanding of conflict needs to incorporate
all three conflict dynamics as belligerents’ choices to fight in the first
place will depend on their expectation of fighting duration and the risk
of recurrence once the fighting stops. We introduce a theoretical frame-
work that treats onset, duration, and recurrence as interdependent
processes. We also present a new duration-duration-duration estimator
that treats pre-conflict duration, conflict duration, and post-conflict
duration as interdependent processes thus permitting improved predic-
tions about the onset/recurrence, duration, and cessation of conflict.
Introduction
The end of fighting cannot be equated with eternal peace. As illus-
trated in Figure 1, 59.1 percent of civil conflicts recur1 and we know 1 This percentage is calculated for the
period between 1946 and 2004 with the
conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Project.
that a history of armed conflict makes recurrence even more likely.
In the long run we can therefore observe multiple peace and armed
conflict spells with varying durations [Kreutz, 2010]. Especially, em-
pirical efforts to identify the causes of recurring and enduring conflict
typically investigate the phases of peace (i.e., survival of peace until
conflict breaks out) and the phases of conflict (survival of conflict
until peace resumes) as if the two phases were unrelated, isolated
episodes [Collier et al., 2004, Walter, 2004, Hegre and Sambanis,
2006, Quinn et al., 2007, Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008]. We challenge
this literature by arguing that peace and armed conflict durations are
interdependent processes that require detailed theoretical and em-
pirical attention [Reed, 2000, Wagner, 2000, Filson and Werner, 2002,
Wucherpfennig, 2011]
1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
N
um
be
r o
f T
e
rm
in
at
ed
 C
on
flic
t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Recurred
Not recurred
Figure 1: Conflict Recurrence Over
Time, 1946–2004. This figure shows
the frequency of conflict recurrence
based on the UCDP data set. The
height of the bars shows the number
of civil conflicts terminated in a given
year. The light gray bars show the
number of terminated conflicts that
have not recurred by the end of 2004,
and the black bars show the number of
terminated conflicts that have recurred
by the end of 2004.
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Our main contribution is to introduce the notion of “triadic dura-
tion” interdependence between the durations of pre-conflict peace,
conflict, and post-conflict peace and provide an empirical estimation
framework to tackle this interdependence. This perspective responds
to the increasing awareness that peace and conflict periods are en-
dogenous processes [Reed, 2000, Wucherpfennig, 2011]To a large
extent scholars so far have focused on the “dyadic duration” interde-
pendence between pre-conflict peace and fighting or post-conflict and
fighting. We argue that we need to expand this perspective and al-
low for civil conflict actors to anticipate not only the consequences of
fighting, but also anticipate the post-conflict bargaining environment.
Figure 2 illustrates why we need a “triadic duration” approach
to grasp the complete data generating process of pre-conflict peace,
conflict, and post-conflict peace duration. In studies that focus on the
explanation of conflict onset on the pre-conflict spell is considered
(panels 1-3 and panels 7-8), while information on conflict duration
is not considered (panels 4-6). In addition, the peace spells (panels
1-3 and 7-8) are treated as I.I.D. and possible interdependence is
not considered. Furthermore, studies that focus on conflict duration
(black panels) treat them as independent of the white panels and
recurrence research regards panels 7-8 independent of panels 1-5.
A few studies have looked “dyadic duration” dependence, that is
allowing for interdependence between either pre-conflict peace spells
and conflict spells or post-conflict peace spells and conflict spells.
However, each of these empirical approaches does not utilize all
observed information about the conflict life-cycle.
Country 3
Country 2
Country 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Figure 2: Stylistic Representation of
Conflict Data. Panels 1-3 represent
pre-conflict peace observations, panels
4-5 illustrate conflict observations, and
panels 7-8 represent post-conflict peace
observations.
At the conceptual level, scholars are well aware that these pro-
cesses are closely interrelated. Recent formal works on organized
violence have begun to look at the onset, continuation, termination,
and recurrence of wars as an interrelated bargaining process [Fil-
son and Werner, 2002, Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007, Powell, 2004,
Wagner, 2000]. The scholarly community has made a considerable
progress in developing detailed datasets on various aspects of conflict
dynamics over the past decades.2 On the other hand, the analytical 2 See, for example, the Correlates of War
(COW) project and Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP).
and predictive tools available to the empirical researchers have not
yet caught up with the developments in theories and large-scale data
sets.
We propose a new empirical approach to studying phases of peace
and conflict in a single, unified framework. We do so by extending
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the existing techniques of survival analysis. Survival analysis (also
called event history analysis, hazard analysis, or duration analysis)
has becomes a widely-used tool for the analyst of political events.
This approach enables the researcher to model the risks of political
event (e.g., conflict, democratization, leadership change) as a time
dependent process. Survival analysis recognizes that the risk of event
happening depends on how long the subject has survived previously
without experiencing the event of interest. In the sense that one can
interpret any binary time-series cross-sectional models as an appli-
cation of survival analysis [Beck et al., 1998, Carter and Signorino,
2010], survival analysis is arguably the single most predominant
mode of analysis in conflict research. Scholars of international and
civil conflict have utilized the technique of survival analysis to study
the duration of conflict (i.e., conflict termination) [e.g., Balch-Lindsay
et al., 2008, Bennett and Stam, 1998, 1996, Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2004, Cunningham et al., 2009, Fearon, 2004, Glassmyer and Samba-
nis, 2008, Goemans, 2000, Krustev, 2006, Langlois and Langlois, 2009,
Ramsay, 2008, Regan and Stam, 2000, Shannon et al., 2010, Slantchev,
2004, Stanley and Sawyer, 2009] and the durability of peace after
and/or before conflict (i.e., conflict onset and recurrence) [e.g.,
Fortna, 2003, 2004, Gibler and Tir, 2010, Glassmyer and Sambanis,
2008, Grieco, 2001, Lo et al., 2008, Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008,
Senese and Quackenbush, 2003, Tir, 2003, Werner, 1999, Werner and
Yuen, 2005].
Although some efforts have been made to investigate the connec-
tion between survival of peace and survival of conflict [e.g., Shannon
et al., 2010, Wucherpfennig, 2011], little research has been undertaken
to look at the whole life span of conflict in a coherent framework. We
offer an approach to predict the onset, termination, and recurrence
of violent conflict in a unified model. In so doing, we present a new
statistical model that estimates consecutive duration processes jointly.
We conduct empirical analyses of violent conflicts using data from
the Uppsala Conflict Project over the period from 1946 to 2008.
We propose three major contributions. First, we introduce the no-
tion of “triadic duration” interdependence to capture the strategic in-
terdependence between pre-conflict peace, conflict, and post-conflict
peace. Second, we propose a new approach to take full advantage of
the information available in typical conflict data. By jointly estimat-
ing the duration of peace and the duration of conflict, our approach
is more efficient and has a better predictive ability. This approach
also facilitates stochastic simulation of the ebb and flow of conflict
across the globe. Finally, we provide and apply a generic statistical
model that implements our proposed framework in the context of
the study of civil wars. Although the statistical model is originally
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developed to capture our theoretical insight about recurring violent
conflict, it can readily be applied to studying other interesting polit-
ical events. Potential applications of this model include democratic
cycling (democratic transition and authoritarian reversal), leadership
change in two-party system, among others.
The past is the present is the past: The logic of conflict and peace
anticipation
At the very heart of the bargaining approach to war lies the assump-
tion that actors are strategic. This implies that actors can anticipate
the consequences of their own behavior conditional on what others
might do. This anticipation means that future outcomes will con-
dition today’s behavior. For example, Schelling [1960] highlights
how states condition their decision to go to war on the likely con-
sequences of their behavior given their beliefs about the opponent
they face, and vice-versa. The discipline of international relations has
embraced this insight and formulated clear conditions under which
bargaining breaks down and war occurs [Fearon, 1995, Powell, 1996,
2002]. In addition, the bargaining literature argues that fighting can
not only be conceptualized as the consequence of bargaining, but that
fighting itself can be part of the bargaining process [Wagner, 2000,
Powell, 2004]. For example, Fearon [2004] demonstrates how commit-
ment problems can lead to long periods of fighting. These insights
lead to an important conclusion: The strategic logic of anticipation
applies to peace and conflict bargaining. In periods of peace, actors
also condition their behavior on the likely consequences of fighting,
whereas in periods of fighting actors condition their behavior on the
likely consequences of peace.
However, actors know that after a breakdown of peaceful bargain-
ing, there will be a period of costly bargaining. Vice-versa, all actors
know that after a period of fighting there will be a period of peace-
ful bargaining [Wucherpfennig, 2011]. Thus, periods of peace are
conditional on periods of fighting and vice-versa. Indeed, there is a
set if models that highlight the endogenous nature of these conflict
situations [Wagner, 2000, Wucherpfennig, 2011]. For example, actors
bargaining while fighting might anticipate disadvantageous post-
conflict institutions that constrain their de-facto bargaining power.
Democracies are likely to favor actors with public support, which
some strong belligerents might lack.
Beyond the very strict sense of strategic behavior, there is also an
element of learning that fosters the interdependence of peace and
conflict spells. Actors are likely to condition their behavior on ob-
served behavior [Slantchev, 2004, Smith and Stam, 2004]. Thus, actors
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constantly update their beliefs depending on what they saw in pre-
vious peace or conflict periods. Especially in countries with multiple
peace and conflict spells, actors should condition their strategies on
past observed behavior.
While many authors are aware of the possibility that peace bar-
gaining impacts conflict bargaining and vice-versa [Reed, 2000, Fil-
son and Werner, 2002], most work focuses either on the pre-conflict
peace-conflict nexus or the post-conflict peace-conflict interdepen-
dence. However, we argue that this “dyadic” interdependence falls
short of theorizing a “triadic” interdependence among pre-conflict
peace, conflict, and post-conflict peace. So what is this “triadic inter-
dependence”? Let us start to think about two actors in a pre-conflict
period t−1. We also assume that the actors can anticipate future
strategic outcomes. Thus, in t−1 each actor anticipates the conse-
quences of bargaining breakdown and the outcome of bargaining
while fighting in t0. In addition, each actor also anticipates the conse-
quences of bargaining outcomes in t0 on the post conflict bargaining
period t1 and its outcomes. This provides a rich strategic environ-
ment. Where all pre-conflict, conflict, and pre-conflict periods are
conditional.
This insight not only holds when we start in the pre-conflict peace
period. Let us start at time period t0 to demonstrate this. In time
period t0 each actor has observed time period t−1 and is likely to
condition their behavior on the observed outcome, but also on the
anticipated outcome of bargaining in the post-conflict period t1.
Again, this highlights that “triadic” interdependence is likely to
influence the the strategic behavior of civil conflict actors.
In fact, when we take the “triadic” interdependence seriously,
there is no real temporal ordering of the interdependent bargaining
periods. Even in the post-conflict period t1 actors will condition their
behavior on the previous periods and the observed behavior is also
the consequence of strategic behavior of the previous periods. Thus,
our theoretical perspective implies that we need to conceptualize
pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict periods as coming from one
common data-generating process. To tackle this challenge we provide
a new estimator that takes into account the theoretically implied
“triadic” interdependence. We test our empirical implications with a
new statistical approach that jointly estimates the duration of peace
and civil conflict, taking into account the dependence between the
two processes. The next section introduces our statistical approach.
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An empirical model of “triadic interdependence”
Let i = 1, . . . , n denote an observation unit (i.e., country) and j =
1, . . . , m denote a time unit (i.e., month). On any given day, a country
is in either one of two states: peace (yi,j = 0) or in conflict (yi,j = 1).
Figure 3 illustrates this setup graphically, with three countries and
eight periods. In these hypothetical data, Country 1 experiences
peace in periods 1 through 3 and 7 through 8 and conflict in periods
4 through 6. On the other hand, Country 2 only experiences peace
and never experiences conflict, whereas Country 3 only experiences
conflict and never experiences peace during the observed periods.
Country 3
Country 2
Country 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Figure 3: Stylistic Representation of
Conflict Data for Three Countries. This
figure illustrates the structure of typical
conflict data. Panels in black show the
time period where conflict is present,
whereas panels in white show the time
period where conflict is absent
Survival analysis (also called event history analysis or duration
analysis) treats these data as a series of observations that are “at risk”
of an event at each time unit. Two types of events are of our interest
here: when a country is currently in peace, then the country is at
risk of conflict onset; when the country is currently in conflict, then
it is at risk of conflict termination. If a country in one state (peace or
conflict) continues to be in the same state by the end of the time unit,
we say the country “survives” the time unit. On the other hand, if a
country experiences a transition from one state to the other during a
time unit j, we say the country experiences a failure at j.
These at-risk observations are bound together to constitute spells.
As we have two different risks in the data, two different types of
spells are present. In peace spells countries are at risk of conflict on-
set whereas they are at risk of conflict termination in conflict spells.
In our hypothetical data set, there are three peace spells as illustrated
in the left-hand-side graph of Figure 4. Peace spell 1 has observed
duration of 4, beginning in period 1 and ends in period 4, when a
conflict breaks out in Country 1. Peace spell 2 begins in period 7 and
ends in period 8 when the observation periods end. Note that peace
spell 2 ends without experiencing conflict onset; therefore, we only
know that peace spell 2 is at least as long as the observed length (2
periods), but we do not get to observe the full duration of peace spell
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2. We treat such spells as censored spells. Peace spell 3 is also a cen-
sored spell. Similarly, the right-hand-side graph of Figure 4 illustrates
conflict spells in the data. Conflict spell 1 has a duration of 4, begin-
ning in period 4 and ending in period 7, whereas conflict spell 2 is
censored in period 8.
Country 3
Country 2
Country 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Peace spell 1 Peace spell 2
Peace spell 3
Country 3
Country 2
Country 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Conflict spell 1
Conflict spell 2
Figure 4: Peace and Conflict Spells.
This figure illustrates how a separate
analysis of peace and conflict duration
utilizes the data. The left panel shows
the information used in an analysis
of peace duration, whereas the right
panel shows the information used in an
analysis of conflict duration.
Suppose we conduct a standard survival analysis of the dura-
tion of peace with this setting. We would be able to utilize the in-
formation from the three peace spells in our data, leaving out the
remainder of the observations. As illustrated in the left-hand-side
graph of Figure 4, the conflict observations shown in gray (periods
7 and 8 in Country 1 and all observations in Country 3) are simply
discarded. Similarly, in a simple survival analysis of the duration of
conflict would utilize the observations in conflict spells, discarding
the information from the peace observations. As illustrated in the
right-hand-side graph of Figure 4, such an analysis discard all the
observations in gray (periods 1 through 3 and 8 in Country 1 and
all the observations in Country 2). This is unfortunate, because we
could potentially learn a great deal about the likelihood of peace sur-
vival from those observations that experience an enduring conflict.
Likewise, observed duration of peace can also inform our inferences
about conflict duration.
We thus propose a new empirical framework that allows us to
utilize more information contained in the data. We do so by con-
structing a likelihood function that takes into account the duration
of conflict (peace) spells in calculating the duration of peace (con-
flict) spells. In other words, our approach allows us to incorporate
information from Country 3 that never experiences peace during
the observation periods in estimating the duration of peace, and to
incorporate information from Country 2 that never experiences con-
flict in estimating the duration of conflict. Moreover, our proposed
model also accommodates the split-population technique that esti-
mates the latent probability that a country is “immune” from conflict.
This technique, recently introduced to political scientists [e.g., Svolik,
2008], is particularly suitable for analyzing conflict data that typically
contain long periods of no conflict.
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Simple Duration Model
We derive our proposed statistical model in several steps. We first
introduce simple survival models for peace and conflict duration.
We then introduce the joint duration model that simultaneously
estimates peace and conflict duration. Finally we present our triadic
duration model that jointly estimates the probability of immunity as
well as peace and conflict duration. For each of the three models, we
present a general model that allows time-varying covariates. That is,
in all of our expositions below, the values of the covariates as well as
the duration are allowed to vary by periods. We do so by evaluating
the likelihood contributions from each country for each period rather
than for each spell.
In the standard analysis of peace duration, the likelihood contribu-
tion from a country-day observation that experiences peace survival
at time j is characterized as a conditional probability that peace sur-
vives the period j, given peace has survived up to j− 1, or
Pr(yi,j = 0|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr(TPi > tPi,j | TPi > tPi,j−1)
=
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j ∩ TPi > tPi,j−1)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
=
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
where TPi is a random variable that represents the duration of peace
for i and tPi,j is the observed duration of peace for i at time j. In our
hypothetical data shown in Figure 4, the values of the observed dura-
tion at periods 1 through 4 are just 1 through 4, whereas the values of
the observed duration at periods 7 and 8 are 1 and 2, respectively. We
use the above equation to evaluate the likelihood contributions from
periods 1 through 3 and 7 through 8 in Country 1, and all periods in
Country 2. 3 On the other hand, the likelihood contribution from an 3 Practically speaking, this means that
we treat periods 1 through 3 in Country
1 as if they were right-censored, even
though these observations belong to a
spell that is not right-censored.
observation that does experience peace failure at time j (period 4 in
Country 1) is given as:
Pr(yi,j = 1|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr(TPi = tPi,j | TPi > tPi,j−1)
=
Pr(TPi = t
P
i,j ∩ TPi > tPi,j−1)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
=
Pr(TPi = t
P
i,j)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
.
We then obtain the total likelihood contributions from all the obser-
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vations in peace spells using the following likelihood function:
LP =∏
[
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
](yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=0) [ Pr(TPi = tPi,j)
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1)
](yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=0)
.
(1)
This model takes into account how long peace has survived previ-
ously in calculating the likelihood of peace survival and peace failure
for each period in the data. It represents a typical duration model
employed in the prevalent quantitative studies of conflict onset.4 We 4 It is true that there is a variation
among conflict studies in terms of the
observation unit (e.g., country, dyad,
directed dyad), the time-unit (e.g., year,
month, day), and parametric speci-
fication of the duration dependence.
Nevertheless, any statistical models
of conflict onset can be expressed as
model (1) with some adjustment.
can also write down a typical model of conflict duration in a similar
manner:
LC =∏
[
Pr(Tci,j > t
c
i,j)
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j)
](yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=1) [Pr(Tci,j = tci,j)
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j)
](yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=1)
,
(2)
where Tci,j is a random variable that represents the duration of con-
flict for i and tCi,j is the observed duration of conflict for i at time j.
It should be clear from these expositions that a conventional model
of peace duration (1) only utilizes information from those observa-
tions where conflict is not already ongoing (i.e., yi,j−1 = 0, or Peace
spells 1–3 in the left-hand-side graph of Figure 4), whereas a con-
ventional model of conflict duration (2) focuses only on observations
where conflict is already ongoing (i.e., yi,j−1 = 1, or Conflict spells 1–
2 in the right-hand-side graph of Figure 4). A separate estimation of
equations (1) and (2) is inefficient as each model discards information
utilized in the other model. In what follows, we present a model that
allows us to estimate these two processes jointly.
Joint Model of Peace and Conflict Duration
The model we present below takes into account the duration of the
previous spells as well as the duration of the present spell up to the
observation period. In other words, the survival of peace is formu-
lated as a function of the survival of peace up to j− 1 as well as the
duration of the previous conflict spell. Let TC
′
i denote a random vari-
able representing the duration of conflict spell for i that precedes
the current peace spell and tC
′
i denote the observed duration of pre-
vious conflict spell for i. Then, the likelihood contribution from an
observation that experiences peace survival at time j is characterized
as a conditional probability that peace survives j, given peace has
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survived up to j− 1 and the previous conflict has a duration tC′i , or
Pr(yi,j = 0|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr
[
TPi > t
P
i,j | (TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
]
(3)
=
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j ∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
=
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
.
Similarly, the likelihood contribution from an observation that experi-
ences peace failure at time j is given as
Pr(yi,j = 1|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr
[
TPi = t
P
i,j | (TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
]
(4)
=
Pr(TPi = t
P
i,j ∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
Pr(TPi = t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
=
Pr(TPi = t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
.
In addition, we also have the likelihood contribution from observa-
tions that experience conflict survival and conflict failure at time j,
respectively, as
Pr(yi,j = 1|yi,j−1 = 1) =
Pr(Tci,j > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
Pr(yi,j = 0|yi,j−1 = 1) =
Pr(Tci,j = t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
,
where TP
′
i denotes a random variable representing the duration of
peace for i that precedes the current state of conflict and tP
′
i denote
the observed duration of previous phase of peace for i. We thus have
the following likelihood function that calculates the total likelihood
of the data:
L =∏
 Pr(TPi > tPi,j ∩ TC′i = tC′i )
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
(yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=0) (5)
 Pr(TPi = tPi,j ∩ TC′i = tC′i )
Pr(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )
(yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=0)
Pr(Tci,j > tci,j ∩ TP′i = tP′i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
(yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=1)
Pr(Tci,j = tci,j ∩ TP′i = tP′i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
(yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=1) .
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To further characterize the likelihood function (5), we begin by
specifying the univariate marginal distribution for the duration
variables, TPi and T
C
i . Using the flexible Weibull specification, the
univariate density function f (·), the survivor function S(·), and the
distribution function F(·) are each given as a function of the scale
parameter λ and the shape parameter α, as follows:
f (t) = Pr(T = t) = λα (λt)(α−1) exp (−λt) (6)
S(t) = Pr(T > t) = exp
(− (λt)α)
F(t) = Pr(T ≤ t) = 1− S(t).
The shape parameter determines whether the risk of “failure” event
(i.e., conflict onset and conflict termination) is increasing (α > 1),
decreasing (α < 1), or constant (α = 1) over analysis time.
We chose the Weibull distribution because of its flexibility and
simplicity. One limitation of the Weibull specification, however, is
that it does not allow for non-monotonic change in hazard. As a
robustness check, we also estimate log-logistic models that allow
for non-monotonicity (but do not allow for a monotonic increase)
in hazard. As we have two choices of parametric specifications for
two types of duration processes (i.e., peace and conflict), we have
four possible combinations of parametric specifications. We choose
among these four models based on fit statistics after estimating all
four models.
We allow the durations of peace and conflict to be conditioned on
vectors of time-varying covariates, XPij and X
C
ij , respectively. We do
so by specifying the scale parameter governing the two durations
as λPij = exp(−XPijβP) for peace duration and λCij = exp(−XCij βC)
for conflict duration, where βP and βC are vectors of the coefficient
parameters.
The next step is to characterize two types of joint distributions that
appear in the likelihood function (5), namely Pr(TA > tA ∩ TB = tB)
and Pr(TA = tA ∩ TB = tB) with (A, B) ∈ {(P, C′), (C, P′)}. If the
two random variables we have were each Normally distributed, the
joint distribution of the two would simply be a bivariate Normal.
However, both TA and TB represent duration, which we assume to
be distributed Weibull or log-logistic. it is not straightforward to
characterize a joint distribution whose marginal distributions are not
Normal. To deal with this challenge, we utilize a copula function
and derive a new joint distribution from the two duration variables.
A copula is a function that binds together two or more univariate
marginal distributions of known form to produce a new joint distri-
bution [Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005]. Consider two random variables
X and Y with associated univariate distribution functions FX(·) and
FY(·). Sklar’s (1959) theorem establishes that there exists a copula
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C( ·, · ; θ) such that a bivariate joint distribution is defined for all x
and y in the extended real line as
FXY(x, y) = Pr(X < x ∩Y < y) = C
(
FX(x), FY(y); θ
)
(7)
where the association parameter, θ, represents the degree of inter-
dependence between the x and y. This result is remarkable because
it shows that we can construct a new bivariate distribution based
on univariate marginal distributions of known form. As long as the
univariate marginal distributions are known, an appropriate choice
of copula function C(·) in (7) enables us to represent the unknown
bivariate distribution. Moreover, we can also characterize the density
function and the conditional distribution functions using a copula, as
follows
fXY(x, y) = Pr(X = x ∩Y = y) =
∂C
(
FX(x), FY(y); θ
)
∂x ∂y
(8)
=
∂C
(
FX(x), FY(y); θ
)
∂FX(x) ∂FY(y)
· fX(x) · fY(y)
fX|Y(x, y) = Pr(X = x|Y = y) =
Pr(X = x ∩Y = y)
Pr(Y = y)
=
fXY(x, y)
fY(y)
FX|Y(x, y) = Pr(X < x|Y = y) =
∫ x
−∞
fX|Y(x, y)
where fX(·) and fY(·) are the univariate density functions for X and
Y.
With these functions, we can thus specify the first type of joint
probability in (5) as
Pr(TA > tA ∩ TB = tB) = Pr(TB = tB)− Pr(TA < tA ∩ TB = tB) (9)
= Pr(TB = tB) ·
[
1− Pr(T
A < tA ∩ TB = tB)
Pr(TB = tB)
]
= Pr(TB = tB) ·
[
1− Pr(TA < tA|TB = tB)
]
= f (tB) ·
[
1− FX|Y(tA, tB)
]
where f (·) is the Weibull density function as defined in (6). The
second type of joint probability in (5) is obtained simply as
Pr(TA = tA ∩ TB = tB) = fXY(tA, tB). (10)
To complete the derivation, the last step is to choose a particular
copula function for C(, ; θ) to characterize functions in (7) and (8).
There are a number of different copula functions that can be used to
construct a multivariate distribution from univariate marginals [Trivedi
and Zimmer, 2005], but some copulas are more flexible than others
in that they can accommodate greater range of dependency between
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the marginals. In this study, we use the Gaussian copula, one of the
most flexible copula functions that can accommodate both positive
and negative dependency. It has the following form
C(u, v; θ) =
∫ Φ−1(u)
−∞
∫ Φ−1(v)
−∞
1
2pi(1− θ2)1/2 exp
[−(s2 − 2θst + t2)
2(1− θ2)
]
dsdt
where Φ−1() is the Gaussian quantile function, −1 < θ < 1 is the
association parameter, and u = Fx(x) and v = Fy(y) for random
variables x and y. With the Gaussian copula, the density and the
conditional functions in (8) have the following forms:
fXY(x, y) = (1− θ2)− 12 exp
[
−1
2
(1− θ2)−1(a2 + b2 − 2θab)
]
exp
[
1
2
(a2 + b2)
]
· fX(x) · fY(y)
(11)
FX|Y(x, y) =
∫ a
−∞
fXY(x, y) = Φ
(
a + θb√
1− θ2
)
where a = Φ−1
(
FX(x)
)
, b = Φ−1
(
FY(y)
)
, and Φ(·) is the standard
Normal distribution function.
The Gaussian copula has a number of desirable characteristics.
First, it allows for independence as a special case (θ = 0). We can
thus test the existence of interdependence between the two processes
by testing whether θ is different from 0. Second, the Gaussian copula
is comprehensive in that as θ approaches the lower (upper) bound of
its permissible range, the copula approaches the theoretical lower
(upper) bound.5 This is not true with other copulas that have been 5 The upper and lower theoretical
bounds of a joint distribution, called
Fre´chet bounds, F− and F+, are defined
as F−(u, v) = max[0, u + v − 1] and
F+(u, v) = min[u, v].
utilized to address selection bias in political science. For example,
the estimator proposed by Sartori [2003] forces one to assume either
one of the theoretical bounds as representing the true data generating
process. The consequence of this is not only that we are unable to
test the existence of interdependence but also that, depending on
the assumption made about the direction of the dependency, we
make completely opposite inferences about the effects of explanatory
variables on outcomes. The copula function utilized in Boehmke et al.
[2006] can accommodate both positive and negative dependency and
allows for testing the direction of dependency, but the permissible
range is limited to θ ∈ (−0.25, 0.25).
Triadic Duration Model: Joint Model with Split-population
We further extend this joint model by incorporating the split-population
technique that allows us to split the observations into those that are
“immune” from conflict and those that are not. This technique has
been developed in medical research where researchers are interested
in identifying those patients that are cured of a disease of interest
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(and hence not at risk of death from the said disease) and those that
are still at risk. When a patient dies of the disease at a given period,
researchers know with certainty that the patient has not been cured
of the disease. When a patient survives a given period, however, one
must consider two possibilities: the patient is cured of the disease of
interest, or the patient is not cured but his/her time has not come at
the period yet. Since “cure” is unobservable, a split-population model
estimates the latent probability that a patient is cured or not.
We apply this technique to the study of peace and conflict by spec-
ifying the probability that a country is “immune” from conflict. In
the context of conflict research, we can think of immunity as the ab-
sence of issues to fight over. According to the bargaining perspective,
parties with potential issues to fight over (i.e., those that are not im-
mune from conflict) can nevertheless avoid war if they can agree to a
bargain that makes both sides better off than costly fighting. The dis-
putants’ ability to find such mutually beneficial agreements, however,
is severely constrained in the presence of informational problems
or commitment problems [Fearon, 1995, Powell, 2006]. We would
expect that these problems generally grow over time, as there will
be a greater chance that some exogenous shocks create sources of
the bargaining problem. It may be the case that one party’s military
power grows faster than that of the other disputing party, which cre-
ates dynamic commitment problems. It may also be the case that the
convergence of expectations with regard to the fighting capabilities
of one another get distorted, creating informational problems. As
the bargaining problem grows severer over time, the conditional risk
of conflict onset given non-immunity should also grow over time,
whereas the risk of conflict onset remains zero for immune countries
(those that do not have issues to fight over in the first place). Split-
population technique allows us to capture this dynamic by estimating
the likelihood of immunity and the conditional risk of conflict given
non-immunity.
Let ci,j denote a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 when-
ever a country is “immune” from conflict, and 0 if a country is at
risk of conflict. Since we do not observe whether the right-censored
country-day observations in the data are immune or not, ci,j is an
unobservable variable. When an observation in a peace spell survives
period j, the country may be either immune or non-immune from
conflict. Then, the likelihood contribution from a country-day obser-
vation that experiences peace survival at time j is a combination of
the likelihood that an observation is immune from conflict and the
likelihood that an observation is not immune but has not experienced
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conflict during the period j. We can thus rewrite equation (3) as
Pr(yi,j = 0|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr
[
{ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j)} |
{ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )}
]
=
Pr[ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )]
Pr[ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )]
=
Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
,
where Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0] is the conditional joint prob-
ability of peace survival and conflict duration given non-immunity.
On the other hand, when an observation in a peace spell expe-
riences conflict, the country must be non-immune and ci,j = 0. To
calculate the likelihood contribution from such an observation, we
rewrite equation (4) as follows:
Pr(yi,j = 1|yi,j−1 = 0) = Pr
[
ci,j = 0∩ TPi = tPi,j | {ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )}
]
=
Pr[ci,j = 0∩ TPi = tPi,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i ]
Pr[ci,j = 1∪ (ci,j = 0∩ TPi > tPi,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )]
=
Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi = t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
.
where Pr[(TPi = t
P
i,j ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0] is the conditional joint
probability density of peace duration given non-immunity.
Our proposed triadic duration model thus have the following
likelihood function:
L =∏
 Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > tPi,j ∩ TC′i = tC′i )|ci,j = 0]
Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
(yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=0)
(12) Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi = tPi,j ∩ TC′i = tC′i )|ci,j = 0]
Pr(ci,j = 1) + Pr(ci,j = 0)Pr[(TPi > t
P
i,j−1 ∩ TC
′
i = t
C′
i )|ci,j = 0]
(yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=0)
Pr(Tci,j > tci,j ∩ TP′i = tP′i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
(yi,j=1)(yi,j−1=1)
Pr(Tci,j = tci,j ∩ TP′i = tP′i )
Pr(TCi > t
c
i,j ∩ TP
′
i = t
P′
i )
(yi,j=0)(yi,j−1=1) .
We let ci,j be a function of covariates, X Ii,j, and use the logit link func-
tion such that Pr(ci,j = 1) =
(
1+ exp(−X Ii,jβI)
)−1
. Therefore,
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we estimate three equations jointly: one for peace duration, one for
conflict duration, and one for immunity.
The Data
We estimate the proposed model with historical data on intrastate
conflict from 1946 through 2004. Our sample consists of all indepen-
dent states as compiled by Gleditsch and Ward [1999].6 During this 6 We used version 5.0 of the list of
independent states, available online at
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/
statelist.html (accessed on May 1,
2013).
period, 177 countries are recognized as independent states. We limit
our focus on 169 countries for which reliable information is avail-
able at some point during this period.7 This procedure generates
7 In other words, we drop 8 countries
for which information on country-
specific characteristics is unavailable for
any period between 1946 and 2004. The
excluded countries are: Barbados, Lux-
emburg, Iceland, Zanzibar, Maldives,
Tibet, Brunei, and East Timor.
2, 761, 631 country-day observations. Each country-day observation
can be either in peace (thus at risk of conflict onset) or in conflict
(thus at risk of conflict termination). We determine whether or not
each country-day observation is in peace or in conflict using infor-
mation from the Upsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data sets.8
8 We used version 4 of the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset as well as the
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset
v.2000-1, available online at http:
//www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/
(accessed on May 1, 2013).
A country-day is coded as experiencing conflict if the country ex-
periences at least one intrastate conflict on a given day.9 Intrastate
9 A country can experience more than
one intrastate conflict at a given time.
Rather than duplicating observations
for those country-days with multiple
ongoing conflicts, we treat them as one
observation for each.
conflicts are observed in 311, 760 (11.3 %) country-days.
Based on these country-day observations, we compute the dura-
tion of peace and intrastate conflict as follows. The duration of peace
at a given time point is calculated as the number of days elapsed
since the closest of the following three dates: (1) the date of termina-
tion of the previous intrastate conflict; (2) the date of independence;
or (3) January 1, 1946. The exact (total) duration for a given peace
spell can be determined only if we get to observe an onset of civil
conflict. Otherwise, we observe the duration of a peace spell up un-
til December 31, 2004, and treat it as right-censored.10 In our data, 10 In fact, the UCDP data sets provide
information up until December 31,
2008. We nevertheless choose 2004 as
the censoring point for two reasons.
First, we use the observations from
2005 through 2008 as “out-of-sample”
data with which to assess the predictive
abilities of our models. Second, reliable
information on many covariates is
available only up to 2004.
there are 387 unique peace spells, of which 160 spells (41.3 %) are
right-censored. The remaining 227 non-censored peace spells (58.7
%) ranges from 3 days to 20,342 days (56 years) in duration. The his-
togram on the left side in Figure 5 shows the distribution of peace
duration for the non-censored spells.
The duration of intrastate conflict at a given time point is calcu-
lated as the number of days elapsed since the closest of the following
three: (1) the date of intrastate conflict onset; (2) the date of inde-
pendence; or (3) January 1, 1946. In our data, there are 228 unique
conflict spells, of which 8 spells are right-censored because civil
conflict was ongoing in these 8 countries as of December 31, 2004.
The date of conflict termination is observed for the remaining 220
non-censored spells.11 The duration of conflict for the non-censored 11 As there are 220 conflict spells with
termination, there are 220 post-conflict
peace spells for which we can observe
conflict recurrence. Conflict recurred
by the end of 2004 in 130 (59.1 %)
post-conflict spells.
conflict spells ranges from 1 day to 18,264 days (50 years).12 The his-
12 The longest conflict spell is observed
for Israel (1949–1999).
togram on the right side in Figure 5 shows the distribution of conflict
duration for the non-censored spells.
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Figure 5: Duration of Peace and Civil
Conflict, 1946–2004. The histogram to
the left shows the duration of peace
(in years) for the non-censored peace
spells (n = 227). The histogram to the
right shows the duration of civil conflict
(in years) for the non-censored conflict
spells (n = 220).
We test the empirical implications of our theoretical argument
with a set of variables measuring the characteristics of peace and
conflict spells. Multilateral conflict takes the value of 1 for con-
flict spells where the government fights with more than one rebel
groups at any point during the course of observation, and 0 other-
wise. Specifically, this variable is coded 1 when (1) the government
fights more than one intrastate conflicts in a given spell, or (2) the
government fights more than one rebel groups in at least one in-
trastate conflict at any given time in a given spell. We rely on infor-
mation from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (the SideB variable)
in coding this variable. Conflict over territory takes the value
of 1 for conflict spells where the incompatible positions between the
government and rebel only concerns territory, and 0 otherwise. Sim-
ilarly, Conflict over government takes the value of 1 for conflict
spells where the parties fight over government, and 0 otherwise.13 13 Conflict spells concerning both
territory and government are therefore
the baseline. In other words, when the
parties fight over both of these two
issues, Conflict over territory and
Conflict over government both take
the value of 0.
We use the Incompatibility variable from the UCDP data set to
code these variables.
To differentiate peace spells with the characteristics of the preced-
ing conflict, we prepare the following variables. Peace following
a conflict takes the value of 1 for post-conflict peace spells, and
0 for peace spells that begin either on January 1, 1946 or the date
of independence. Peace following a multilateral conflict
takes the value of 1 for post-conflict peace spells where the value
of Multilateral conflict for the preceding conflict is 1, and 0 for
non post-conflict peace spells and post-conflict peace spells that fol-
low a bilateral conflict. Peace following conflict over territory
and Peace following conflict over government are coded in a
similar manner. Furthermore, we use information from the UCDP
Conflict Termination Dataset to code how the preceding conflict is
terminated. Peace following government victory takes the value of
1 for post-conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict ends in
government victory, and 0 for non post-conflict peace spells and post-
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conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict does not end in
government victory. Peace following rebel victory takes the value
of 1 for post-conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict ends
in rebel victory, and 0 for non post-conflict peace spells and post-
conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict does not end in
rebel victory. Finally, Peace following peace/ceasefire agreements
takes the value of 1 for post-conflict peace spells where the disputing
parties ends the preceding conflict with either a peace agreement or a
ceasefire agreement.
We also control for a number of structural characteristics of a
country. These variables are taken from Fearon and Laitin [2003]
and Bleaney and Dimico [2011]. We impute the missing values of the
structural variables using the semiparametric imputation technique
proposed by Hoff [2007].
Empirical Results
Table 1 shows the estimated coefficients from our proposed tri-
adic duration model of peace and conflict duration with Weibull
parametrization for both processes. As we noted previously, we chose
the parametric specification based on fit statistics. Specifically, we es-
timated four different models that employ different combinations of
parameterization: Weibull (peace)–Weibull (conflict), Weibull (peace)–
Log-logistic (conflict), Log-logistic (peace)–Weibull (conflict), and
Log-logistic (peace)–Log-logistic (conflict). These models generate
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores of 7668, 7696, 7669, and
7693, respectively. We thus chose Weibull–Weibull specification as
it generates the lowest AIC score. As we have three equations, there
are three sets of coefficients. Coefficients for the peace and conflict
duration (first and second columns) are represented in the acceler-
ated failure time metric; positive estimates are thus associated with
longer duration. Variables with positive estimates in the “Immunity”
equation (third column) are associated with higher likelihood that the
country is immune from conflict. Finally, estimates for the auxiliary
parameters, α and θ, are shown at the bottom of the table.14 14 Note that α and θ are re-
parameterized as log(α) and tanh−1(θ),
respectively. This is necessary because
the duration dependence α can only
take positive values, and the correlation
θ is only defined between −1 and 1.
We can see that the estimated log(α) for peace spells is positive,
generating α > 1. This result implies that the conditional risk of
conflict onset given “non-immunity” is increasing over time, con-
trolling for the covariates and the interdependence of conflict and
peace duration. This is consistent with the theoretical expectations
from the bargaining perspective. As discussed above, we expect that
the risk of bargaining breakdown for parties with potential issues to
fight over (i.e., those that are not immune from conflict) should grow
larger over time. The estimated log(α) for conflict spells is negative,
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Peace Duration Conflict Duration Immunity
Characteristics of Peace
Peace following a conflict −3.39
(0.39)
Peace following a multilateral conflict −0.13
(0.21)
Peace following government victory 1.15
(0.20)
Peace following rebel victory 0.36
(0.26)
Peace following conflict over territory 0.80
(0.28)
Peace following conflict over government 1.30
(0.31)
Peace following peace/ceasefire agreements 0.59
(0.20)
Characteristics of Conflict
Multilateral conflict 0.85
(0.41)
Conflict over territory −1.22
(0.63)
Conflict over government −1.61
(0.63)
Structural Factors
Per capita GDP (logged) 0.43 −0.16
(0.09) (0.15)
Oil −0.68 −0.27
(0.17) (0.32)
There exist 1+ excluded groups −0.25 0.63
(0.20) (0.34)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.61 −0.18 −3.41
(0.29) (0.51) (1.09)
Cold War 0.22 0.59 −1.20
(0.14) (0.26) (0.57)
Anocracy −7.69
(2.83)
Constant 6.87 8.65 1.07
(0.75) (1.33) (0.57)
log(α) (duration dependence) 0.21 −0.59
(0.06) (0.05)
tanh−1(θ) (correlation) 0.10
(0.01)
Number of spells (time-constant) 387 228
Number of observations (time-varying) 6944 1123
Table 1: Triadic Duration Model of
Peace and Conflict, 1946–2004
generating α < 1. This suggests that the risk of conflict termination is
decreasing over time, other things being equal. Finally, the estimated
correlation parameter tanh−1(θ) is positive, generating θ = 0.1. This
suggests that peace duration and conflict duration are positively cor-
related, conditional on the covariates and our model specifications.
To illustrate the relevance of our triadic approach, Table 2 com-
pares the estimation results from our triadic model with a simple
model of conflict and peace duration.15 The first column reports the 15 Coefficients for the intercept and
some of the structural variables are
omitted for brevity.
results from two simple duration models, one for peace spells and
the other for conflict spells.16 These results correspond to the results 16 We obtained the results for the first
column by estimating the two equations
simultaneously while assuming there
is no correlation between the two equa-
tions. Such “joint but independent”
estimation is mathematically equivalent
to estimating two separate models for
peace and conflict duration.
typically reported in conflict research that assumes as if the two pro-
cesses were unrelated. The second column reproduces the same re-
sults reported in Table 1. Figures 7 and 8 plot these coefficients along
with the estimated confidence intervals to illustrate the differences in
the estimates. We can assess the relative performance of these models
by comparing Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores from each
model, as the first model is nested in the second. We can see that our
triadic duration model fits the data better than either of the other two
models, yielding the lowest AIC score of all three.
One of the striking differences between the estimates from these
different models is that the values of the estimated duration de-
pendence for peace spells differ sharply by models. The estimate is
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negative in the simple duration model, suggesting that, without ac-
counting for the interdependence nor the unobserved immunity, the
risk of conflict onset is decreasing over time. On the other hand, the
estimate is positive in our triadic duration model.
Simple Duration Triadic Duration
Peace Equation
Peace following a conflict −2.13 −3.39
(0.52) (0.39)
Peace following a multilateral conflict −0.12 −0.13
(0.33) (0.21)
Peace following government victory 0.83 1.15
(0.27) (0.20)
Peace following rebel victory −0.13 0.36
(0.36) (0.26)
Peace following conflict over territory 0.73 0.80
(0.46) (0.28)
Peace following conflict over government 1.29 1.30
(0.48) (0.31)
Peace following peace/ceasefire agreements 0.29 0.59
(0.28) (0.20)
log(α) (duration dependence) −0.18 0.21
(0.06) (0.06)
Conflict Equation
Multilateral conflict 0.82 0.85
(0.41) (0.41)
Conflict over territory −1.07 −1.22
(0.62) (0.63)
Conflict over government −1.44 −1.61
(0.62) (0.63)
log(α) (duration dependence) −0.64 −0.59
(0.05) (0.05)
Immunity Equation
Ethnic Fractionalization −3.41
(1.09)
Anocracy −7.69
(2.83)
Cold War −1.20
(0.57)
tanh−1(θ) (correlation) 0.10
(0.01)
Log-likelihood −3898 −3805
AIC 7843 7668
Table 2: Results from Simple Duration
Models and the Triadic Model
These results make sense in light of the bargaining perspective. As
discussed above, the bargaining perspective suggests that the condi-
tional risk of conflict onset given non immunity should be increasing
over time, as there will be greater chances of bargaining breakdown
over time as long as the issues to fight over are present. Our triadic
duration model captures this dynamic, whereas the other two models
fail to do so. The simple duration model generates negative dura-
tion dependence, implying that the risk of conflict onset appears to
be decreasing over time. This is driven by the fact that many of the
countries that are immune from conflict (i.e., those that do not have
parties with issues to fight over) experience long duration of peace
and thus the ratio of immune countries to all the surviving coun-
tries must be growing over time. Then, if we fail to account for the
unobservable immunity, it may appear to be the case that the risk of
conflict onset is declining.
To illustrate the better fit of our proposed model, we calculate the
expected duration for uncensored peace and conflict spells accord-
ing to the triadic duration model and the simple duration model.
Figure 6 displays the estimated probability densities of expected du-
ration according to the simple duration model (dashed curve) and
our triadic duration model (solid curve) against a histogram of the
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Figure 6: Observed and Predicted
Distribution of Uncensored Duration.
The histograms show the empirical
(i.e., observed) distribution of peace
(left) and conflict (right) duration for
uncensored spells. In each graph, solid
curves in black show the estimated
density of duration according to our
joint model, whereas dashed curves
in red show the estimated density of
duration according to simple model
duration models.
observed uncensored duration of peace (left) and conflict (right). The
left-hand-side graph clearly shows that the triadic duration model
predicts a distribution of duration that is much closer to the actual
distribution of the uncensored duration of peace, although the two
models hardly differ in performance for the conflict spells. This sug-
gests that the proposed model provides a much better fit to the data
on peace duration than do models typically employed in the litera-
ture.
Observed Predicted
Country Start End Duration Duration Absolute Error
Peace Spells Triadic Simple Triadic Simple
Turkey 1993-01-01 2005-06-17 4549 5064 13504 515 8955
Mali 1995-01-01 2007-08-31 4624 5064 8621 440 3997
Azerbaijan 1995-03-18 2005-10-09 3857 5970 17406 2113 13549
Niger 1997-11-30 2007-04-30 3437 4352 6358 915 2921
Peru 2000-01-01 2007-11-14 2873 4506 9317 1633 6444
Israel 2000-01-01 2006-07-13 2384 2448 9812 64 7428
Congo (Dem. Rep.) 2002-01-01 2006-11-28 1791 2492 3203 701 1412
Central African Republic 2003-01-01 2006-11-28 1426 5022 7247 3596 5821
Chad 2003-01-01 2005-12-18 1081 1898 3147 817 2066
Myanmar 2004-01-01 2005-01-16 380 916 2307 536 1927
Sri Lanka 2004-01-01 2005-12-02 700 2813 6339 2113 5639
Georgia 2004-08-20 2008-08-08 1448 1666 4592 218 3144
Median Absolute Error 759 4818
Conflict Spells
Burundi 1994-10-18 2006-09-08 4343 654 474 3689 3869
Nepal 1996-08-23 2006-11-22 3743 976 711 2767 3032
Indonesia 1999-06-19 2005-10-13 2308 909 667 1399 1641
Russia 1999-07-18 2007-10-08 3004 1928 1346 1076 1658
Ivory Coast 2002-09-20 2005-01-01 834 480 367 354 467
Haiti 2004-02-09 2005-01-01 327 501 364 174 37
Median Absolute Error 1238 1650
Table 3: Out-of-Sample Predictions for
Peace and Conflict Spells
We further demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by calcu-
lating the predicted duration for the out-of-sample periods. Specif-
ically, we calculate the expected duration for all the spells that are
censored on December 31, 2004 and subsequently uncensored by
December 31, 2008. In our data, there are 12 peace spells and 6 con-
flict spells that fit this description. For each of these 12 peace spells,
we calculate the predicted duration until the onset of a next conflict
according to our triadic duration model and the simple duration
model.17 Similarly, for each of these 6 conflict spells we calculate the 17 The predicted duration until “fail-
ure” is obtained by calculating the
expected value of a duration vari-
able. By definition, the expected value
of a random variable is obtained by
multiplying the t by the density func-
tion f (t) and integrating, such that
E(T) =
∫ ∞
0 t f (t)dt =
∫ ∞
0 S(t)dt. We
used the values of the covariates for De-
cember 31, 2004 to calculate the values
of S(t) from each model.
predicted duration until conflict termination.
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Table 3 summarizes the results. The third column shows the ob-
served duration until conflict onset or termination in days. The
fourth and fifth columns show the predicted duration according to
the triadic and simple duration models. The last two columns show
the absolute difference between the observed and predicted values of
spell duration. We can see that our triadic duration model performs
remarkably better compared with the simple duration model. Indeed,
for the peace spells, estimates from our preferred approach provide a
median prediction error that is 6 times smaller (smaller by 11 years)
compared with the simple duration model. The reduction in error
is less pronounced for the conflict spells, but the error is smaller by
more than 1 year for our approach.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llog (alpha)
Excluded group
Cold War
Oil
Ethnic Fractionalization
Per capita GDP
After Peace/Ceasefire
Agreement
After Conflict
over Gov't
After Conflict
over Territory
After Rebel Victory
After Gov't Victory
After Multilateral Conflict
After Conflict
Figure 7: Comparing Coefficients: Peace
Spells. Circles show the point estimates
and horizontal line segments associates
with circles show the 95% confidence
intervals. Solid circles show the results
from our triadic model of peace and
conflict duration, whereas hollow
circles are from the separate model of
peace duration.
Conclusion
This might be the end to this article, but it is hopefully the begin-
ning of further research to theoretically and empirically embrace the
notion that we need to treat pre-conflict peace duration, conflict du-
ration, and post-conflict peace duration as interdependent processes.
Our main argument is that we should not only focus on the depen-
dence between either pre-conflict peace duration and conflict duration
or pre-conflict peace duration and conflict duration, but that we need
to deal with “triadic duration” interdependence in the context of civil
conflicts. This perspective is motivated by the assumption that actors
are strategic and can anticipate not only the outcomes of a conflict
bargaining phase, but also consider the anticipated outcomes of a
potential post-conflict bargaining process.
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Figure 8: Comparing Coefficients:
Conflict Spells. Circles show the point
estimates and horizontal line segments
associates with circles show the 95%
confidence intervals. Solid circles show
the results from our triadic model of
peace and conflict duration, whereas
hollow circles are from the separate
model of conflict duration.
Herein, we introduced an estimation approach that captures im-
portant elements of this “triadic duration” interdependence. Our
empirical results demonstrate that a model that allows for interde-
pendence provides improved out-of-sample predictions. The im-
proved prediction performance is likely to be driven by more precise
estimates that are provided by our approach.
Our proposed model not only fits the data better but also reveals
some interesting conflict dynamics that a simple duration model fails
to capture. Specifically, our model implies that the conditional risk of
conflict onset given non-immunity is growing over time, consistent
with the bargaining perspective. This dynamic is masked in a simple
duration model that conflates the “immune” disputants that expe-
rience long peace because there is no issue to fight over and those
“non-immune” ones that experience long peace because they manage
to maintain peace in the presence of such issues.
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